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john darwin usefully reminds us (chapter 2 here) that the “exit strategies” of 
the colonial powers were not in many cases strategies for withdrawal; on the con-
trary, they were the consequence of the search for ways to continue to exercise influ-
ence, but more cheaply. Moreover, these decisions were not taken freely. The colonial 
powers did not suddenly decide willingly to give up their overseas possessions. The 
decisions were the product of a specific historical context in which colonialism as a 
form of rule was increasingly unacceptable to the international community. The 
colonial powers were therefore under growing pressure to bring an end to colonial 
rule and needed to find other more acceptable—and more sustainable—ways to 
maintain their influence. This analysis is particularly relevant to understanding the 
pattern and nature of the French withdrawal from Senegal. Indeed, until 1959 France 
did not have an exit strategy for its African empire. In 1938 the British colonial sec-
retary, Malcolm MacDonald, had stated that Britain’s ultimate aim was to bring the 
colonies to self-government, albeit at some unspecified, and no doubt remote, date. 
In contrast, France’s 1944 Brazzaville African Conference categorically rejected “any 
possibility of a future outside the French empire” and stated that “the introduction 
of self-government in the colonies, even in the distant future, must be ruled out.”1 
Each of the major colonial reform projects after 1944—reconfiguring the empire 
and renaming it the French Union (Union Française) in 1945; the Framework Law 
(Loi-cadre) of 1956, which devolved certain powers to the government councils that 
were established in the individual colonial territories; the creation of the Commu-
nity (La Communauté) in 1958—was seen not as a series of stages on the road to 
self-government and eventual independence but rather as a means of maintaining 
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the French presence and influence. Only in 1959, after de Gaulle returned to power, 
did the government finally abandon its Canute-like efforts to hold back the rising 
tide of anticolonialism and announce that it would grant independence to any colo-
nial territories that requested it. Within little more than twelve months, the process 
was complete, and all the territories of former French West and French Equatorial 
Africa had achieved political independence or, to use the term de Gaulle preferred, 
“international sovereignty.”
From the French point of view, France’s exit from sub-Saharan Africa was suc-
cessful, as the transfer of power passed off smoothly and without any significant 
bloodshed. This was crucial for French interests, since a conflictual decolonization 
process would have undermined efforts to maintain influence in the region after 
independence, as had happened in Indochina and was about to happen in Algeria. 
Moreover, Senegal did not suffer from military coups or political instability after 
independence, unlike a number of other former French colonies in sub-Saharan 
Africa. In the context of this book, the following questions therefore arise: how was 
France able to manage the process so successfully? And can its apparently successful 
exit provide any useful lessons for those charged with designing contemporary exit 
strategies? In response, I will argue that the notion of a “successfully managed tran-
sition” is, in the case of Senegal, essentially a post hoc reconstruction of events that 
bears little relation to what actually happened on the ground. There was no carefully 
designed exit strategy for the decolonization of Senegal. Rather, France was “on the 
back foot” throughout the period 1945–60, constantly forced to rework colonial 
policy in response to the rapid unfurling of events over which it had little or no 
control. Only when the government finally faced up to the inevitability of indepen-
dence in 1959 did it seek to develop an exit strategy. However, by this time it was 
more a question of trying to dress up the scuttle out of Africa as a managed transi-
tion, when in fact the process had generated a momentum of its own that none of 
the key actors on either the French or the African side could any longer do much to 
alter. In order to understand the apparent success of the French exit from Senegal, 
we therefore need to look elsewhere. If there was no carefully elaborated French, or 
for that matter African, strategy behind the smooth transition, we need to ask 
instead what specific set of historical circumstances made it possible. We also need 
to take into account the continuing political commitment to the French presence in 
Senegal postindependence, which played a key role in ensuring a relatively smooth 
transition.2
This chapter will seek to explain French success by reference to three factors. First, 
the length of the French presence in Senegal, dating back to the foundation of Saint-
Louis in 1659, made it possible for France to develop an exceptional range and depth 
of links with Senegalese society. In particular, it will be argued that this enabled 
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France to establish good links with both “traditional” elites in Senegalese society, for 
example religious leaders, chiefs, traders, and peanut producers, and the western-
ized, French-educated “modern” elites. Crucially, both had a stake, and a common 
interest, in the maintenance of good links with France. Second, and related, thanks 
to their long history of interaction, French and Senegalese political leaders shared 
certain values and sufficient elements of a common “language” of development and 
modernization to make successful cooperation over the nature of the transition pos-
sible. The shared political culture of French republicanism played a key role here. 
Moreover, within the context of the French Union, both gave priority to stability 
over state-building, both attached overriding importance to social and economic 
modernization over political independence, and both identified with the discourse 
of “cooperation” that was now used in place of “colonialism” to describe their 
(shortly to become postcolonial) collaboration. Finally, the benign international 
context was vital. There was a broad international consensus about the need for, and 
desirability of, decolonization that ran across the spectrum from the new postwar 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to the newly independent 
states, many of which had joined the nonaligned movement within the UN. No 
external intervention, therefore, seemed likely to destabilize the process once it was 
under way.
Decolonization as exit Strategy?
The term “end of empire” appears to suggest that an event took place that marked 
the end of an era and that following the withdrawal of the former colonial power, 
the age of empire drew to a close. This is misleading in its representation of decol-
onization in at least two important respects that are especially pertinent to French 
decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa. First, decolonization is not an event but a 
prolonged process, with political independence just one of the way markers— 
albeit symbolically a very significant one—on a journey that starts some time 
before independence and continues for many years afterward. Political indepen-
dence is a highly charged symbolic event, as it is the moment when the flag is 
lowered and the colonial power apparently “exits.” However, if we take the longer 
view of decolonization as a prolonged process, then it is clear that in the case of 
Senegal, none of the key actors conceived of decolonization as leading to the with-
drawal of the colonial power. On the contrary, for de Gaulle as for Léopold Sédar 
Senghor, the leader of Senegal’s main political party from 1947 who became its 
first president at independence in 1960, the granting of “international sovereignty” 
was not intended to mean secession from France but rather a renegotiation of the 
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colonial settlement.  Wolfgang Mommsen’s analysis can help us here. He conceptu-
alizes colonial rule as a series of constantly renegotiated “unequal bargains” 
between the European imperialist groups and various indigenous groups on the 
local level, which varied greatly in character according to circumstances and time.3 
From this perspective, decolonization should be seen as the process of renegotia-
tion of the bargains that underpinned colonial rule. It does not mark the end of 
imperialism but simply meant that the “bargains” to be struck were no longer as 
one-sided as they had been.4
In the case of France’s African empire, this process of renegotiation had in effect 
started at the Brazzaville Conference. De Gaulle and his soon-to-be provisional 
government acknowledged that the old colonial regime could not be sustained after 
the war and that reforms would be needed in recognition of the loyalty of the 
empire to France and the sacrifices made by Africans during the war. The conference 
itself could not enact reform; it could only make recommendations, but the spirit 
of its recommendations was enshrined in the constitution of the Fourth Republic. 
The notion of a “blood debt” to Africans in recognition of the contribution they 
made to the war effort gave sustenance to the arguments of French and African 
colonial reformers, who used the opportunity to renegotiate the “colonial bargain.”5 
Thus, in 1946 the new constitution established the French Union, uniting metro-
politan France and the overseas territories, as the colonies were now called, into a 
“republic” both “one and indivisible,” and the former subjects of the empire became 
citizens of the French Union. In a similar vein, the Loi-cadre of 1956 was intended 
not to prepare the colonies for independence but to bind them more closely to 
metropolitan France. It devolved certain powers—over economic development, ed-
ucation, and health for example—to the government councils that were created in 
each colonial territory, while at the same time “repatriating” certain key powers 
from the governments-general in Dakar and Brazzaville back to Paris, for example 
over defense, security, the financial and monetary regime, the media, and higher 
education. The Community, which emerged from the 1958 referendum establishing 
the Fifth Republic, was similarly conceived. Its member states were granted internal 
autonomy, but defense, security, the currency, financial and economic affairs, and 
strategically important raw materials were to be Community—in effect French 
government—competences.
Moreover, the term “decolonization” suggests a level of organization and control 
that is rarely present; in practice, decolonization is a process that none of the key 
actors is fully in a position to control. This is especially true with respect to timing. 
Even as late as 1958, the architects of the Community were establishing an institu-
tional structure that was intended to maintain formal and highly centralized links 
between France and its African empire. None foresaw that less than two years later, 
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all the French colonial territories in Africa would have gained their independence. 
Moreover, decolonization is a process in which the ultimate outcome is indetermi-
nate. It may have a range of different meanings for the political actors involved, 
none of whom is in a position at the time to foresee with any certainty where the 
process will lead and what its ultimate outcome might be. This is, as we shall see, 
significant in the case of Senegal because it was initially granted independence, 
along with French Soudan, as part of the Federation of Mali in June 1960.6 The 
Federation split just two months later; had the split not occurred, it is very likely 
that independence would have led to a much more definitive French “exit” from 
Senegal, given the different meanings the political leaderships of the two countries 
attached to the process of decolonization. Thus, for the Senegalese leadership, 
independence was not in itself a political priority.7 Rather, decolonization was con-
ceived of as a process of emancipation that would result from economic and social 
development. In this sense, decolonization was presented by Senegal’s political 
leaders as indissociable from development, which meant giving priority to main-
taining the link with France, since French financial and technical assistance would 
be needed in order to accelerate the process. For the Soudanese leadership, in con-
trast, the priority was to gain independence from France as a first step on the road 
to pan-African unity. A free, strong, and united Africa would then be in a position 
to promote economic and social development for the benefit of all the continent’s 
peoples.
The Role of Indigenous elites
Indigenous elites played a key role in determining the pattern, timing, and nature of 
decolonization. France’s colonial presence depended on collaboration with the 
leaders of a range of powerful vested interests in Senegalese society. Donal Cruise 
O’Brien, in his classic study Saints and Politicians, identifies five different elite types 
who acted as intermediaries between the colonial state and rural Senegalese society: 
the politician-saint (“saint as politician”), the chief, the colonial civil servant 
(“bureaucrat”), the trader, and the elected candidates of the main Senegalese polit-
ical parties.8 “Saint” is the term Cruise O’Brien uses to describe the leaders of the 
three Sufi Muslim orders in Senegal: the Tijaniyya, the Quadiriyya, and the Mou-
rides. The colonial regime introduced by the French lacked moral authority and was 
thus forced to come to an arrangement with the Sufi saints in order to function ef-
fectively. France’s key allies among these saints were the Mourides, who controlled 
groundnut production. They were vital intermediaries for French rule, first because 
the revenues from groundnut exports paid for the colonial government, and second 
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because of the mass support they enjoyed across a vast area of central Senegal: “The 
state must provide material rewards to win their [the saints’] compliance.”9 The 
saints then used these resources to reinforce their authority over their followers (tal-
ibé) by passing on a share of these rewards. Moreover, their role as saints and politi-
cians meant that they were in a position to promise their followers both spiritual 
and material benefits. In return for their obedience and for the tribute they paid him 
by working on his land, the saint promised his followers otherworldly rewards, as 
well as, ultimately, access to owning their own land. Since many of the followers 
were landless and from the poorest sections of society, such promises provided a 
powerful incentive for them to work for, and demonstrate allegiance to, the saint. 
The resulting expansion of agrarian settlement also suited the colonial government, 
who saw it as an opportunity to expand further the colony’s tax base and export 
revenues.
Chiefs and colonial civil servants both relied directly on French support. There 
were different types of chiefs in colonial Senegal. Village chiefs usually enjoyed some 
claim to “customary” authority, whereas canton chiefs were French appointees. The 
latter were nominated either in place of village chiefs whom the colonial administra-
tion found to be insufficiently cooperative or in areas where there was no recogniz-
able tradition of chiefly authority. In this case, the colonial administration appointed 
canton chiefs, as they needed intermediaries with whom they could work. In both 
cases, the chiefs were not independent agents, as their authority was conditional on 
French approval. Similarly, the colonial civil servant—whether clerk, interpreter, or 
primary school teacher—was ultimately dependent on French support. He (the vast 
majority were men) was immediately answerable to his direct superior, but the 
ladder of hierarchy led back to the main urban centers and the colonial government. 
As decolonization approached, more and more of these superiors would come 
from the French-educated African elite, thus increasing exponentially the number 
of Senegalese with a stake in the system.
The trader was a significant figure for two reasons. To be a successful trader you 
needed good political alliances, as it was the government that allocated import-
export licenses and organized the marketing of export produce. This meant maintain-
ing good contacts with the colonial government, and as decolonization approached, 
these allegiances transferred from the French administration to the new African-led 
government council created by the Loi-cadre.
Finally, there were the elected candidates of the main Senegalese political parties. 
Senegal has a long tradition of competitive elections going back to the nineteenth 
century. In 1848, the Second French Republic awarded its Senegalese colonies the 
right to send an elected representative to Paris. By the 1880s, residents of the Four 
Communes of Senegal were electing their own municipal councils, and in 1914 they 
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elected the first African deputy, Blaise Diagne, to the Chamber of Deputies in 
Paris.10 After World War II, the right to elect deputies to Paris was gradually 
 extended to voters throughout Senegal, and universal suffrage was introduced in 
1956, so that successful politicians now needed to cultivate their connections with 
rural Senegalese society in order to extend their support base beyond the Four 
Communes. Senghor was the first Senegalese political leader to realize the political 
significance of this extension of the suffrage. In 1948 he resigned from the French 
Socialist Party, which at the time dominated Four Communes politics under its 
leader, Lamine Guèye, and created his own party, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégal-
ais (BDS), so as to develop and consolidate his electoral support base in the towns 
and villages of rural Senegal beyond the Four Communes.11 As this happened, the 
BDS, as the dominant party, steadily increased the patronage resources at its dis-
posal. By the time it won the 1957 Territorial Assembly elections, taking forty-seven 
of the sixty seats, the Bloc Populaire Sénégalais (BPS), as it was now called, had 
patronage networks that extended throughout Senegal. Thanks to the internal au-
tonomy introduced by the Loi-cadre, the BPS-led government council also now 
had substantial patronage resources, both economic and political, at its disposal. In 
the 1958 constitutional referendum organized by de Gaulle, this system of patronage 
delivered a huge yes vote in favor of the Community and against immediate inde-
pendence from France.
Each of these elites derived material and political benefits from the French colo-
nial presence and thus had a stake in its perpetuation. Their participation in the 
market economy and collaboration with the colonial government were vital to the 
stability of colonial rule. It was a system from which all the participants benefited, 
albeit to varying degrees. Crucially, it also ensured that members of the small, 
French-educated elite who dominated party politics in Senegal had close links 
with elites in rural society. Moreover, as Cruise O’Brien points out, these indige-
nous elite types were in practice less clearly distinguishable than the foregoing cat-
egorization might appear to suggest. For example, the same individual might at 
different times, or simultaneously but in different contexts, be saint, chief, colo-
nial civil servant, trader, or party politician.12 In addition, the extension of elec-
toral politics to the whole of Senegal after World War II ensured that Senegalese 
political leaders developed solid alliances with leaders from all the key sectors of 
Senegalese society. Thus, a complex web of interlocking, and sometimes overlap-
ping, networks linked the late colonial state solidly, via a range of indigenous 
intermediary elites, to Senegalese society. It is not surprising, therefore, that as 
decolonization progressed and political independence became inevitable, the pri-
ority of the different elite actors involved was to keep as much of this system in 
place as possible.
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a Common “language”
The fact that French and Senegalese political elites, on the basis of their long history 
of interaction, shared certain values and spoke sufficient elements of a common 
“language” was crucial to the smooth transfer of power at independence. By this I do 
not mean simply the fact that Senegal’s political leaders spoke French, although 
clearly the fact that they had been educated in French schools and imbued with 
French culture played a significant part in establishing an “emotional bond” between 
them and the colonial power.13 Just as important in this context are the normative 
and ideational structures that social and political actors assimilate during their polit-
ical socialization and that play a key role in shaping their political behavior. J. A. 
Mangan defines political socialization as follows: “Narrowly conceived [it is the] 
deliberate inculcation of political knowledge, values and practices by agents and 
agencies formally charged with the responsibility. Broadly conceived, it may be con-
sidered to encompass not only political but also apparently non-political learning, 
formal and informal, calculated and uncalculated, which affects the learning of po-
litically relevant individual and group behavior.”14 The political socialization of Sen-
egal’s political leaders took place in French schools, through their interactions over 
many years with the French colonial government and French politicians and through 
their experience as deputies elected to the National Assembly in Paris. As a result, 
they shared with France’s governing elites a set of ideas, norms, values, and implicit 
rules—which Lynn Hunt calls “political culture”—that both informed and shaped 
the political choices they made.15 I was this shared framework, this common polit-
ical culture, that helped to determine the collective intentions and actions of Sene-
gal’s political leaders and provided the foundation for a smooth, relatively seamless 
transfer of power.
The core values of French republicanism—the ideals of liberty, equality, frater-
nity, and progress that, in principle at least, provide its ideological underpinning—
were central to this common political culture and provided the basis for a shared 
understanding of the key challenges facing Senegal after World War II.16 These may 
be summarized as follows: to improve living conditions; to put an end to the colo-
nial system and its racist structures; and to restore African dignity and cultural iden-
tity.17 In other colonial contexts, demands for improved living conditions, an end to 
the colonial system, and the restoration of African dignity would represent not only 
a challenge to the “universal values” of French republicanism but would also provide 
the foundation for a nationalist campaign for independence. However, in Senegal 
this form of nationalism was associated with a small French-educated elite who had 
limited support outside Senegal’s main towns. This radical minority, led by the stu-
dent and youth movements and subsequently joined by some trade union leaders, 
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was the only group to demand independence before 1959.18 For the majority of Sen-
egal’s political and community leaders on the other hand, these challenges could be 
addressed within “the great ‘diverse and indivisible’ Republic” through a process of 
reform.19 Immediate political independence, therefore, was not a priority.
Thus, following the reestablishment of republican government after the collapse of 
the Vichy regime and the creation of the French Union in 1946, French and most 
Senegalese political leaders shared a belief that overhauling the colonial system could 
best be achieved through closer integration with the Republic and the full application 
of its core values, rather than through secession from it. For most Senegalese the pri-
ority was to improve their living standards and put an end to the racism of the colo-
nial regime, while for much of the French-educated elite and most trade unionists it 
was to win for Africans the same economic and social rights as metropolitan French 
people.20 Logically, therefore, the watchword of political campaigns in the 1940s and 
1950s was not independence but equality, which meant not only equal political rights 
but also equal social and economic rights and equal educational opportunities. The 
rationale for this was that emancipation would be achieved through the application 
of the principle of equality concurrently with the modernization of the economy. In 
this respect, the Economic and Social Development Fund (Fonds d’Investissement 
pour le Développement Economique et Social; FIDES), created by the government 
in 1946, played a crucial role, as it spent considerable sums of money on infrastructure 
and economic development projects throughout French sub-Saharan Africa by the 
1950s.21 Senegal’s political leaders were keen to retain this investment, as they shared 
the view that economic and social modernization was a precondition for liberty and 
real independence, rather than the other way around.22 Thus, Senegal’s political 
leaders linked, in their discourse, the achievement of liberty to economic and social 
development, not to political independence, and this was to take place within the 
context of the French Union, through the adoption and application of the core mod-
ernizing and progressive values of the “one and indivisible” republic, not by secession 
from it.
Three linked concepts were central to this discourse: coopération (untranslatable 
into English simply as “cooperation”), “development,” and “international sover-
eignty.” Coopération meant much more than simply “working together toward a 
common end.” Following independence, a range of bilateral accords were signed 
with the new governments of almost all the former French colonies in sub-Saharan 
Africa, covering economic, political, military, technical, and cultural cooperation. 
Coopération also referred to the new Ministry of Cooperation, which was estab-
lished in 1961 to replace the Ministry for Overseas France (former Colonial Minis-
try) in carrying out the job of managing the French aid missions in France’s former 
colonies in sub-Saharan Africa; but perhaps coopération’s greatest novelty was that 
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“it involved a systematic transfer of expertise via technical aid experts and teachers 
living in the assisted countries.”23 Indeed, French experts and teachers went to the 
former colonies of French-speaking Africa in large numbers in the 1960s and 1970s 
to assist in the development of the newly independent countries: there were 
forty-five thousand of them in 1960 and still almost forty thousand in 1969.24 More-
over, the budget devoted to coopération was huge in comparison with present-day 
aid budgets: 1.41 percent of GNP in 1960, declining to 0.9 percent in 1964, which is 
still well above the current UN development aid target for industrialized countries 
of 0.7 percent.
For France the stakes were high, and the size of the coopération budget reflected 
this: the aim was, quite simply, successful decolonization.25 As Gérard Bossuat aptly 
puts it, coopération was “the ultimate adaptation of a European country, anxious to 
capitalize on its past, to the new international scene. In other words it was another 
manifestation of France’s traditional role as a world power—the pursuit of power 
politics by other means.”26
However, had it been only this, coopération would have been unlikely to obtain 
the support of African political leaders such as Senghor, who were under pressure 
from an increasingly vocal nationalist movement. Coopération was also portrayed 
as representing a new type of partnership between the developed and developing 
world that was not based on exploitation, the aim of which was to promote the 
development of France’s former colonies. In a 1964 speech to the National As-
sembly, de Gaulle’s prime minister, Georges Pompidou, expressed the ideal under-
lying the policy of coopération as follows: “in the context of a policy of coopération 
with developing countries, those who give and those who receive must make ex-
changes in which each brings something to the other. Similarly, the term ‘devel-
oping’ signifies that the aim of coopération is to push the countries being assisted 
along the road to development and not simply to keep them, if I may put it this way, 
with their heads above water.”27 This discourse of coopération to promote economic 
and social development was echoed by the developmentalist discourse of Senegal’s 
main political leaders in the run-up to independence and the immediate postcolo-
nial period.28
Finally, coopération chimed with de Gaulle’s vision of international relations in 
the postcolonial world. He envisaged France playing a leading role in creating a new 
multipolar world order in which the old divisions between colonial power and 
colony would diminish and Cold War rivalries would abate. Moreover, the two pro-
cesses were linked, as he saw the extension of French influence in the Third World as 
a means of breaking down Cold War divisions. The bedrock of this new world order 
was the nation-state, in which individual sovereign states would cooperate with 
each other on the basis of bilateral alliances.29 Never an unqualified supporter of 
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colonialism as a form of government, de Gaulle was by 1959 convinced that colo-
nialism had had its day and that a new means of projecting French power beyond 
 metropolitan France was required. The aspiration of all peoples to govern their own 
affairs was natural and universal; it could not therefore be denied to the peoples of 
France’s colonies.30 Hence his advocacy of granting international sovereignty to 
France’s former colonies in Africa. However, this did not mean that France should 
withdraw from these countries. On the contrary, he believed that France would be 
in a position to develop a real partnership with them only once they had achieved 
international sovereignty, based on bilateral agreements and grounded in French 
humanism and the universal values of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Working to-
gether with France, these countries would form a grouping with the potential to 
have real influence in the global arena. It was a vision from which all the partners, 
French and African, stood to benefit.
To be sure, there was an element of the conjuring trick to all of this, since— 
the discourse of coopération and international sovereignty notwithstanding—the 
partnership was clearly never an equal one.31 Yet Senghor and other African political 
leaders bought into it. The role of de Gaulle was crucial here. To many Africans of 
Senghor’s generation, de Gaulle was the “man of Brazzaville” and, as the leader of 
Free France, was seen as the liberator of Africa. Senghor’s poem “Guelowar” (The 
Noble One), written to de Gaulle from a prison camp in 1940, expresses his admira-
tion for the man: “Your voice speaks honour and hope and war, the fierce beating 
wings of our breast; / Your voice cries out for the republic—let us raise up that City 
in a blue day / Of equality for brotherly peoples. So we sing in our hearts. ‘We are 
here, Guelowar!’”32 His reputation as a decolonizer, as some have suggested, may 
have been scarcely deserved, but it was nonetheless how many Senegalese perceived 
de Gaulle at the time.33
The Mechanics of Transition
In the constitutional referendum of September 28, 1958, that brought both the 
French Fifth Republic and the Community into being, the constituent territories of 
what had been the federation of French West Africa voted yes to membership of the 
Community; only Guinea voted no and chose immediate independence. Those who 
voted yes, including Senegal, in so doing opted for internal political autonomy 
within a federation dominated by France, in which France continued to control the 
key policy areas of foreign affairs, defense, the currency, economic and financial 
policy, justice, strategic raw materials, higher education, and transport.34 Within the 
Community, the French president played the central role: “the current head of state 
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[General de Gaulle] has every intention of exercising the functions of president of 
the community .  .  . gradually removing from the government of the Republic the 
determining power of decision in Community affairs.”35 This remodeling of the 
French Union to create the Community was intended by its architects to provide a 
durable foundation for continuing close relations between France and its African 
colonies. However, African political leaders rapidly perceived it as an inadequate 
response to their demands and too restrictive in terms of the powers it transferred to 
them. As early as January 1959, the Senegalese prime minister, Mamadou Dia, 
declared to the press: “Our objective is full independence in association with France, 
with a status similar to that enjoyed by Ghana within the Commonwealth. . . . The 
Executive Council must be progressively transformed into a conference of prime 
ministers of independent states.”36 On March 24, 1959, the Parti de la Fédération 
Africaine, with which Senegal’s main political party was affiliated, committed itself 
to “the progressive evolution of the Community into a multinational confedera-
tion,” and in September the leaders of Soudan and Senegal jointly announced their 
intention to exercise their right to independence, although no firm timescale was 
established, and France held separate negotiations for the transfer of powers with 
the political leaders of the two territories.37
From the outset and throughout the process of transition, the watchword—on 
both the Senegalese and French side—was “evolution.” Both sides were at pains to 
underline the “evolutionary” and negotiated nature of the process and to emphasize 
that independence did not in any way mean a break from France. Indeed, it was for 
this reason that the mechanism of a negotiated “transfer of powers” was chosen, 
rather than a referendum, as the means to achieving independence, because it was 
feared that a referendum would provide a platform for radical nationalists to cam-
paign for a more complete independence and this would lead to a distancing from 
France.38 Moreover, negotiations for the transfer of powers were accompanied, as we 
have seen, by the parallel negotiation of bilateral association agreements. In essence, 
the French approach was thus to help the new African governments build their 
states by reproducing French administrative, legal, and educational systems in the 
newly independent countries, with large numbers of French civil servants, teachers, 
lecturers, and military advisers to be seconded to, and embedded within, the new 
African administrations.39 The actual process of transferring powers was launched 
by the president of the Mali Federation, Léopold Sédar Senghor, in Dakar, in the 
presence of General de Gaulle, on December 13, 1959. Expressing his gratitude to, 
and confidence in, “the man of the 18th of June” (“l’homme du 18 juin”), who had 
launched the struggle for the liberation of France in 1940, he declared: “You are, Mr 
President, the inheritor of the French Revolution, which for the first time in the 
world dared to proclaim the rights of man and of the citizen. . . . We trust in you to 
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‘do the rest’ with us. . . . You have understood us: you have understood the History 
of this Century”; and he finished: “we aim to achieve our national independence, 
not against France, but with France, in a great Franco-African grouping, by friendly 
and constitutional means.  .  . . Beyond constitutional independence, we aim to 
achieve ‘real independence and guaranteed cooperation,’ which is what you are of-
fering.” De Gaulle’s response was similarly gracious and eloquent. He pointed to 
France and Africa’s shared language and ideas and acknowledged the legitimacy of 
their claim to “international sovereignty,” recognizing that without a state, you “do 
not exist in the international order.” He stated his preference for the term “interna-
tional sovereignty” rather than “independence,” as it accorded better with the spirit 
of the age, and he went on: “No one in truth enjoys total independence. . . . But in-
ternational sovereignty means . . . a lot. It means that a people takes responsibility for 
managing its affairs itself. . . . There is no international existence that is not first of all 
a national reality.” He finished by saying that the Mali Federation and its member 
states would achieve this objective “with the agreement, the support, the help of 
France.”40
The following six months were taken up with detailed negotiations over arrange-
ments for the transfer of powers, the allocation of public property, and the appor-
tioning of responsibility for interest and capital payments on debts contracted by 
the territories during the colonial period; the government of the Mali Federation 
agreed to pay a substantial proportion of these.41 Discussion of the “association 
agreements” that the French and the new African governments would sign once 
independence had been granted took place in parallel with these negotiations. Per-
haps the most difficult area was defense, where the desire of the Federation’s leaders 
to assume responsibility had to be reconciled both with the need to defend the 
Community as a whole and with the French government’s requirement to maintain 
exclusive control of its armed forces and decisions about their deployment. Ulti-
mately, it was agreed that France would help the Mali Federation develop and train 
its armed forces, and in return the Federation would seek military assistance exclu-
sively from France. Once these negotiations were completed, the two territories 
gained their independence from France as the Mali Federation on June 20, 1960, and 
the Franco-Malian coopération accords were signed two days later.
It is worth reiterating that the image of General de Gaulle played a key role in this 
smooth transition. Whereas he was seen by many in France at this time as “the man 
of the 13th of May,” who had acted unconstitutionally in 1958 to bring down the 
Fourth Republic, for most Africans he was still “the man of the 18th of June,” the first 
French leader who had dared to take a stand against Hitler, the leader of Free France, 
and the liberator of Africa from the racist Vichy regime. Senegal’s political leaders 
thus saw de Gaulle as a leader whom they could trust.
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The evolutionary approach to the transition reflected the fact that neither party 
actually wanted “exit” to mean effective French withdrawal. On the contrary, once 
decolonization became inevitable, the priority was to retain as much as possible of 
the Franco-Senegalese partnership into the postcolonial era. However, with the tide 
of anticolonial nationalism rising in Senegal, as in the rest of Africa, this was a 
strategy that could easily have been knocked off course by mass anticolonial mobili-
zation, at which point Senegal’s political leaders would have been obliged to choose 
between their preferred strategy of partnership with France or support for the rad-
ical nationalists who demanded immediate independence. This is where the notion 
of a common language was so important. It was not enough for Senegal’s political 
leaders to know that, in choosing the partnership option, they would not be aban-
doned by France. They also needed a shared understanding of the challenges facing 
the country and a common language in which to express it. In addition, they needed 
a discourse to justify and legitimize their strategy of partnership, which they could 
then use to “sell” it to their people. Otherwise, the clarion call of the radical nation-
alists for immediate independence would have become irresistible, leaving those ad-
vocating partnership politically isolated.42
a Benign International environment
The alliances with indigenous elites cultivated over many years, the elements of a 
common political culture, a shared “language,” and the role played by de Gaulle at 
the center of the decolonization process would not in themselves have been suffi-
cient to ensure success for France’s chosen “exit” strategy without the presence of a 
benign international environment. In the mid-1950s, the colonial government and 
the indigenous elites with which it collaborated in francophone Africa were, as we 
have seen, coming under pressure from a new generation of anticolonial activists 
who were often better educated and more in touch with the world beyond France—
through their university education or their contacts with the international trade 
union movement or other anticolonial movements—than their elders. They were 
impatient with their political leaders’ strategy. Imbued with the “spirit of Bandung,” 
they did not believe that working with France for the economic and social develop-
ment of Africa as a precondition for real independence would deliver rapid im-
provements in the standard of living of the majority of Africans, or that it would 
lead to an end to discrimination and cultural humiliation.43 Moreover, in the con-
text of the growing international rejection of colonial rule, the structures of the 
French Union appeared increasingly obsolete. By the end of 1957, this new genera-
tion of activists was demanding immediate independence. It was shortly after this 
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that de Gaulle returned to power in France. He soon understood that France needed 
to adjust to the new international climate if it was to retain influence in the 
 postcolonial era.44 An “exit” that did not mean imperial withdrawal thus had to be 
rapidly engineered.45
For this to be successful in the context of the Cold War, there needed to be no 
likelihood of intervention by the superpowers or their proxies, and U.S. support 
or, at the very least, acquiescence was vital, as the Suez debacle demonstrated. In 
fact, U.S. policy on decolonization in the 1950s was somewhat ambiguous. It 
was more supportive of the colonial powers in Asia, for example, where the 
United States perceived the communist “threat” as real.46 In West Africa, where 
the United States did not perceive any immediate communist danger, it favored 
decolonization.47
There also needed to be no risk of intervention by a neighboring country. This 
was where the alliance between Senegal and Soudan to form the Federation of 
Mali was problematic. Soudan’s political leader, Modibo Keita, had served his po-
litical apprenticeship in the Groupes d’Etudes Communistes after the war, and his 
political party, the Union Soudanaise, was the territorial branch of the Rassemble-
ment Démocratique Africain, which had been affiliated with the Communist 
Party in Paris from 1946 to 1950. By 1958, Soudan was dominated by a single party, 
the Union Soudanaise, which was seen by the French government as Marxist, sub-
versive, separatist, and anti-French.48 The political culture of Soudan’s political 
leaders was thus quite different from that of Senegal’s political leaders. Although 
both had roots in the French Republican tradition,49 the former were strongly 
influenced by the language and praxis of the French Communist Party, in partic-
ular the notion of the revolutionary single party, whereas the latter, rooted in Sen-
egal’s long tradition of competitive electoral politics, were more attuned to notions 
of political pluralism. These differences came to a head in August 1960, when Keita 
sought to transform the federation into a unitary state by means of a military coup 
while Senghor was out of the country. Senghor immediately returned to Senegal, 
Keita was arrested, and he and his associates were sent back to Soudan by sealed 
train. Senghor decided that the price of remaining part of the federation was too 
high, that it threatened his strategy of a smooth and negotiated process of transi-
tion, and that Senegal should therefore leave the federation.50 Senegal and 
 Soudan—now renamed Mali—subsequently joined the UN as separate states on 
September 27, 1960.
Thus, while the transfer of powers went relatively smoothly, the creation of the 
Mali Federation did not. In the end, Senghor achieved his objective of independence 
for Senegal in friendship with France, but this very nearly was not the outcome, 
despite the broadly favorable international environment.
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Conclusion
So what can those charged with responsibility for designing modern exit strategies 
learn from the experience of France’s colonial “exit” from Senegal? As this chapter 
has shown, the circumstances in which the decolonization of Senegal took place 
were very specific, and it is therefore difficult to identify parallels with modern situ-
ations. Moreover, and it is important to underline this, when in 1959 the govern-
ment did finally acknowledge that the transfer of power was inevitable, this was not 
at any time conceived as a withdrawal, but rather as a reconfiguration of the 
long-standing Franco-Senegalese relationship. Finally, as we have seen, the term 
“strategy” is hardly an adequate description of the hastily engineered transition that 
took place over the following twelve months. That said, the fact that the transfer of 
power passed off so smoothly despite the improvised circumstances can tell us some-
thing about the necessary preconditions for a successful transition.
First, indigenous elites who are prepared to collaborate with the occupying power 
play an essential role. The plural is also important here: a small indigenous elite that 
is marginal or unrepresentative will almost certainly not be in a position to deliver a 
smooth transition. Furthermore, these elites must have genuine popular support. 
The fact that the elites with whom France collaborated in Senegal had real and deep 
roots in indigenous society meant that these elites were able both to carry the ma-
jority of the population with them in their chosen strategy of decolonization in 
partnership with France and to isolate politically those radical nationalists who were 
arguing for a different approach. Second, the fact that they shared a common polit-
ical culture with France played a key role in facilitating this collaboration. This was 
especially significant because of the way France’s exit had to be improvised at the last 
minute. The fact that France’s governing elites shared the discourse of coopération 
and development with Senegal’s political leaders was also important in terms of 
smoothing the road to decolonization, although of course its limits rapidly became 
apparent and the demands for development and socioeconomic equality were the 
ones that were least satisfied by political independence.51 Third, the trust that existed 
between the political leaders of France and Senegal was key to the success of the 
process. They knew each other well, having rubbed shoulders as elected members of 
the French National Assembly under the Fourth Republic, and the sense of a shared 
history, particularly during World War II, was cultivated by the political leaders of 
both countries. The role of de Gaulle and Senghor was crucial in this respect. None-
theless, once the decision to “exit” was made, the process developed a momentum of 
its own, and within twelve months France had formally “left” Senegal. Fourth, dis-
tant from the main theatres of East-West rivalry, the international context for decol-
onization in West Africa was favorable and supportive. Despite this, the smooth 
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transfer of power to a pro-French government came close to being knocked off 
course. Even in a benign environment, the planned transition runs the risk of being 
derailed by the unpredictability of events.
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